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ADMIRALTY LAW 
COLOMA v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS: 
THE BATTLE OVER MARITIME "STATUS" 
CONTINUES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Coloma u. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs/ the Ninth Circuit considered whether a cook who 
worked in a dining facility located on a longwharf was a "mari-
time employee" and therefore eligible to qualify for benefits 
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation 
Act (LHWCA).2 The Ninth Circuit held that because the cook's 
duties did not involve loading or unloading a vessel, he was not a 
"maritime employee"3 and was ineligible for workers' compensa-
tion benefits under the LHWCA.4 
II. FACTS 
Cerefino Coloma was employed by Chevron USA as a ship's 
cook.~ Beginning in January 1975, Coloma worked at the 
1. Coloma v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 897 F.2d 394 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (per Sneed, J.; additional members of the court were Hug. J., and Leavy. J.), 
cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3244 (1990). 
2. Coloma, 897 F.2d at 395. The LHWCA is codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1988). 
3. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) defines "maritime employee" as "any person engaged in mari-
time employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring 
operations, and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-
breaker, ... " 
4. Coloma, 897 F.2d at 400. 
5. Coloma v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 897 F.2d 394, 395 
(9th Cir. 1990). Before going to work for Chevron USA, Coloma spent 20 years in the 
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"Seagull Inn"6 on the Richmond, California, longwharf.7 The 
"Seagull Inn" provided free dining6 to the officers and seamen of 
visiting Chevron tankers9 while shipboard stewardslo took shore 
leave. ll 
Chevron closed the Inn in 1982, and transferred most of the 
cooks to shipboard galleys on tankers.12 Coloma was transferred 
to the tanker, HILYER BROWN. IS Before leaving the "Seagull 
Inn," Coloma contracted a skin condition on both hands, result-
ing from the chemical cleansers he used at the Inn.14 Two weeks 
after transferring to the HILYER BROWN, he was medically 
discharged because of that condition. lli 
Coloma sought permanent disability benefitsl6 under the 
LHWCA.17 The Administrative Law Judge determined that 
Coloma was not a "maritime employee" under 33 U.S.C. § 
902(3),18 and was not entitled to LHWCA benefits.19 Coloma ap-
6. [d. The "Seagull Inn" was the "crews' mess" for Chevron employees. Id. 
7. [d. The Richmond Longwharf extends roughly one mile into San Francisco Bay, 
and is used to load and unload tankers. Reporter's Transcript of Trial before Adminis· 
trative Law Judge at 28-30, Coloma v. Chevron Shipping Co., 18 Ben. Rev. Bd. Servo 
(MB) 434 (1986). 
8. Coloma, 897 F.2d at 395. Free meals were provided in lieu of a meal allowance. 
Id. at 396. 
9. 46 C.F.R. § 35.35-1 (1989). The Coast Guard's regulations require ship's crew to 
remain aboard during cargo operations, so the "Seagull Inn" was established to feed the 
crew dockside while the vessel's regular galley hands took shore leave. Reporter's Tran-
script of Trial before Administrative Law Judge at 23, Coloma v. Chevron Shipping Co., 
18 Ben. Rev. Bd. Servo (MB) 434 (1986). 
10. A shipboard steward is an officer responsible for provisions and dining arrange-
ments. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 676 (1984). 
11. Coloma, 897 F.2d at 395. Occasional visitors (Coast Guard officers, Customs Offi-
cials, Harbor Pilots and outside contractors) were allowed to eat at the "Seagull Inn" but 
were charged for their meals. The general public was not allowed on the wharf. [d. at 
395-96. 
12. [d. at 396. 
13. [d. Coloma transferred to the HILYER BROWN on July 14, 1982. [d. 
14. [d. at 395. 
15. Appellant's Deposition at 4-5, Coloma v. Chevron Shipping Co., 18 Ben. Rev. 
Bd. Servo (MB) 434 (1986). 
16. Coloma, 897 F.2d at 395. Coloma received long-term disability benefits from 
Chevron for one year (from 1983 to 1984). Letter from CIGNA Insurance Co. to Coloma 
(Jan. 20, 1984). These benefits were renewable only if Coloma was found unable to per-
form any job within Chevron or any other company for which he was qualified to per-
form and if he qualified to receive Social Security Disability benefits. [d. Coloma did not 
meet the requirements and was denied continuation of long-term disability benefits. [d. 
17. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1988). See supra note 3 for statutory language. 
18. See supra note 3 for definition of maritime employee. 
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pealed the adverse decision to the United States Department of 
Labor Benefits Review Board.20 The Board affirmed the denial 
of benefits. 21 
Coloma appealed the Review Board's decision to the Ninth 
Circuit.22 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSA-
TION ACT 
At the turn of the century, Congress and the states23 at-
19. Coloma, 897 F.2d at 396. The Administrative Law Judge stated: 
[Coloma's] tasks of cleaning tables, washing dishes and cook-
ing were neither "inherently maritime" nor were they signifi-
cantly different from the tasks that are performed in dining 
halls, cafeterias and restaurants on land . . .. The evidence 
does not establish that claimant's employment involved any 
aspect of the process of loading, unloading, repairing or 
building vessels. Because the "Seagull Inn" principally fed 
seamen and not longshoremen, claimant's work was in aid of 
Chevron's seafaring and navigational activities and not in aid 
of any longshoring functions performed on the wharf. 
[d. (emphasis in original). 
20. [d. 
21. [d. 
22. [d. Under the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA, contested compensation 
claims are first heard by an Administrative Law Judge. 33 U.S.C. § 919(d) (1988). Claim-
ant may then appeal this decision to the Benefits Review Board (a five-member board 
appointed by the Secretary of Labor). 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1988). The Benefits Review 
Board is empowered "to hear and determine appeals raising a substantial question of law 
or fact taken by any party in interest from decisions with respect to claims of employees 
under this Act .... " 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3). An adverse decision of the Benefits Review 
Board may then be reviewed "in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in 
which the injury occurred .... " 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). 
23. Congress involved itself with providing state compensation benefits pursuant to 
the U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 which confers admiralty jurisdiction upon the federal govern-
ment. The House Report discusses why Congressional action was necessary: 
Congressional action is necessary if these [longshoremen] 
are to be given the benefits of workmen's compensation owing 
to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States and 
the decisions of the Supreme Court thereunder. 
Article 3, section 2, of the Constitution provides that the 
judicial power of the United States shall extend "to all cases 
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," and Article I, section 
8, confers upon Congress power "to make all laws which may 
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the forego-
ing powers and all other powers vested by this Constitution in 
3
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tempted to provide compensation for land-based injured mari-
time workers through state compensation programs.24 These at-
tempts were frustrated in 1917 when the United States Supreme 
Court held that the states were without power to provide a 
workmen's compensation remedy to longshoremen211 injured on 
the gangplank extending from a ship to the pier.28 Thus, long-
shoremen injured on a gangplank's seaward27 side had no rem-
edy while longshoremen injured on the pier were protected by 
the Government of the United States or in any department or 
officer thereof." 
The Supreme Court has held that these provisions of the 
Constitution grant to Congress "paramount power" to fix and 
determine the maritime law of the United States. 
H.R. REP. No. 1190, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1926) (citations omitted). 
The need for Congressional involvement in state compensation programs was also 
discussed on the floor of the House of Representatives: 
Mr. O'CONNOR of New York: It has been the effort of all 
leaders interested in this question of social justice to find a 
way out of this jurisdictional dilemma. That way was clearly 
pointed out by Mr. Justice McReynolds in the recent case of 
The State of Washington v. Dawson (264 U.S. 219). The court 
there stated that Congress had the' power to protect these 
workmen, and this bill [the LHWCAj carries out the sugges-
tion of our highest court. 
In this legislation we are appealing for justice to 300,000 
men, 100,000 of whom are employed at the port of New York 
and along the Great Lakes. 
68 CONGo REC. 5413 (1927). 
24. See Employers' Liability Act, ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232 (1906) which was Congress' 
first attempt to provide a federal workmen's compensation system. This Act was found 
to be "repugnant to the Constitution of the United States," therefore non-enforceable. 
Howard V. Illinois Cent. R.R., 207 U.S. 463 (1908). In Howard, the Court held that while 
the Employer's Liability Act of 1906 embraced subjects within the authority of Congress 
to regulate, it also included subjects not within its constitutional power and as such were 
non-enforceable under the Commerce Clause. Howard, 207 U.S. at 504. 
25. A longshoremen is a dock laborer who loads and unloads cargo. WEBSTER'S II 
NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 412 (1984). 
26. Southern Pac .. CO. V. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (state maritime law which 
modifies or contravenes federal maritime law is invalid under the Constitution). The 
Court found: 
Exclusive jurisdiction of all civil cases of admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction is vested in the Federal district courts, "sav-
ing to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy 
where the common law is competent to give it." The remedy 
which the [State] Compensation Statute attempts to give is of 
a character wholly unknown to the common law, incapable of 
enforcement by the ordinary processes of any court, and is not 
saved to suitors from the grant of exclusive jurisdiction. 
Jensen, 244 U.S. at 218 (citations omitted). 
27. The seaward side is the side at or towards the sea. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE 
DICTIONARY 624 (1984). 
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state compensation acts. 28 This line of demarcation between 
land and water became known as the "Jensen line."29 Using the 
geographic demarcation of the "Jensen line," state compensation 
coverage was extended to the landward side of the water's edge, 
but no further.30 Unhappy with this gap in coverage,31 Congress 
enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act (LHWCA) of 1927.32 
Congress designed the LHWCA to be a federal workmen's 
compensation remedy33 for longshoremen and harbor workers 
28. See Northeast Marine Terminal v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977) (language of the 
1972 Amendments to the LHWCA is broad, suggesting that the courts take an expansive 
view of LHWCA coverage). 
29. See Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini N. River As-
soc., 459 U.S. 307, 307 n.14 (1983) (maritime employee covered prior to the 1972 Amend-
ments was still covered). 
30. Maritime Personal Injury: The Expanding Coverage of the Longshoremen's 
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act., 43 LA. L. REV. 849, 852 (1983). 
31. See S. REP. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1926); H.R. REP. No. 1190, 69th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1926) which illustrate Congress' dissatisfaction with the gap in cover-
age created by the States' inability to remedy injuries on navigable waters: 
Nearly every State in the Union has a compensation law 
through which employees are compensated for injuries occur-
ring in the course of their employment without regard to neg-
ligence on the part of the employer or contributory negligence 
on the part of the employee. If longshoremen could avail 
themselves of the benefits of State compensation laws, there 
would be no occasion for this legislation; but, unfortunately, 
they are excluded from these laws by reason of the character 
of their employment; and they are not only excluded but the 
Supreme Court has more than once held that Federal legisla-
tion can not, constitutionally, be enacted that will apply State 
laws to this occupation. 
It thus appears that there is no way of giving to these 
hard-working men, engaged in a somewhat hazardous employ-
ment, the justice involved in the modern principle of compen-
sation without enacting a uniform compensation statute. 
S. REP. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1926) (citations omitted). 
The committee. . . recommends that this humanitarian legis-
lation [the LHWCAI be speedily enacted into law so that this 
class of workers, practically the only class without the benefit 
of workmen's compensation, may be afforded this protection, 
which has come to be almost universally recognized as neces-
sary in the interest of social justice between employer and 
employee. 
H.R. REP. No. 1190, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1926). 
32. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 2, 44 Stat. 
1424 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1988». 
33. Congress enunciated that: 
The purpose of this bill [the LHWCAI is to provide for com-
5
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injured beyond the pier and thus beyond the jurisdiction of state 
compensation programs.34 Initially, the two requirements for 
coverage were that the maritime worker must be injured on the 
navigable waters311 of the United States and the worker must not 
be eligible for state compensation benefits.36 These two require-
ments together are commonly known as the "situs" test37 of the 
LHWCA.38 
In 1972 the LHWCA was amended to provide additional 
protection for longshoremen and harbor workers.3s The 1972 
pensation, in the stead of liability, for a class of employees 
commonly known as "longshoremen." These men are mainly 
employed in loading, unloading, refitting, and repairing ships; 
but it should be remarked that injuries occurring in loading or 
unloading are not covered unless they occur on the ship or be· 
tween the wharf and the ship so as to bring them within the 
maritime jurisdiction of the United States. 
S. REP. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1926). 
34. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 216 (1969) (LHWCA covers 
injuries upon the navigable waters but does not cover all injuries occurring on a pier even 
though the pier extends over navigable waters). 
35. The LHWCA did not define the term "navigable waters"; however, the United 
States Supreme Court found that waters are navigable when they form a continued high-
way over which commerce is or may be carried on with other states or foreign countries. 
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1871) (steamer engaged in transporting goods des-
tined for other states was engaged in commerce between the states and thus was subject 
to legislation by Congress). But see Reynolds v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., 788 F.2d 264, 
265 (5th Cir. 1986) (LHWCA provides exclusive remedy for shipfitter injured while con-
ducting test sail of new vessel), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986) in which the Fifth 
Circuit found that navigable waters do not end at the three-mile limit. A well-known 
commentary in the field of admiralty law concludes that navigable waters do not include 
small bodies of water wholly in one state and not navigable in interstate or foreign com-
merce. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK JR .. THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 32-33 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinaf-
ter GILMORE & BLACKj. 
36. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 35, at 281. Coverage was provided for "injury 
occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including dry dock) and if 
recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may 
not validly be provided by State law." Id. 
37. The "situs" requirement looks to the location of the claimant at "the moment of 
injury." See Alford v. MP Indus., 16 Ben. Rev. Bd. Servo (MB) 261 (1984) (shores ide 
worker injured in motor vehicle accident while running errand for employer does not 
satisfy situs requirement to qualify for benefits under LHWCA). 
38. See Nacirema, 396 U.S. at 215, which discusses the two requirements for cover-
age as the "situs" test. 
39. See Brahm, Longshore Newsletter Procedure Manual, Ch. I, p. 3 (1989). Con-
gress perceived several weaknesses in the LHWCA: a substantial jurisdictional problem 
that allowed maritime workers to step in and out of coverage; an arbitrary demarcation 
line (the Jensen line) that would allow non-maritime workers to collect benefits simply 
due to their location on navigable waters at the time of injury; and, a benefit structure 
that was outdated and out of step with the wages of maritime workers. Id. 
6
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. LHWCA Amendments expanded the "situs" test from covering 
workers injured on navigable waters to covering injuries that oc-
curred on piers, wharves, or any other area used in loading, un-
loading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel.40 The 
Amendments also added a "status" requirement which injured 
workers must satisfy before coverage is allowed.41 
Status is the occupational component of LHWCA cover-
age;42 a worker's status defines whether the claimant is a "mari-
time employee." Due to Congress' failure to describe "maritime 
employment" in either the original LHWCA or its legislative 
history, the 1972 Amendments require an initial determination 
of status before benefits can be conferred!3 Congress intended 
to cover workers involved in the loading, unloading, repairing, or 
building of a vessel." Thus, an employee covered under the 
40. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1988). 
41. 33 US.C. § 902(3) (1988). See supra note 3 for statutory language. 
42. See P.C. Pfeiffer Co., Inc. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 80 (1979) (claimants involved in 
intermediate steps of moving cargo between ship and land transportation were engaged 
in maritime employment under the LHWCA), which defined status as the occupational 
component of LHWCA coverage. 
43. Northeast, 432 U.S. at 265. 
44. [d. at 267. The House Report to the 1972 Amendments illustrates Congress' in-
tent to cover all those involved in the loading and unloading process: 
The intent of the Committee is to permit a uniform compen-
sation system to apply to employees who would otherwise be 
covered by this Act for part of their activity. To take a typical 
example, cargo, whether in break bulk or containerized form, 
is typically unloaded from the ship and immediately trans-
ported to a storage or holding area on the pier, wharf, or ter-
minal adjoining navigable waters. The employees who perform 
this work would be covered under the bill for injuries sus-
tained by them over the navigable waters or on the adjoining 
land area. The Committee does not intend to cover employees 
who are not engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or build-
ing a vessel, just because they are injured in an area adjoining 
navigable waters used for such activity. Thus, employees 
whose responsibility is only to pick up stored cargo for further 
trans-shipment would not be covered, nor would purely cleri-
cal employees whose jobs do not require them to participate in 
the loading or unloading of cargo. However, checkers, for ex-
ample, who are directly involved in the loading or unloading 
functions are covered by the new amendment. Likewise the 
Committee has no intention of extending coverage under the 
Act to individuals who are not employed by a person who is an 
employer, i. e., a person at least some of whose employees are 
engaged, in whole or in part in some form of maritime employ-
ment. Thus, an individual employed by a person none of 
whose employees work in whole or in part, on navigable wa-
7
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LHWCA is required to be "any person engaged in maritime em-
ployment"'11 including longshoremen46 and harbor workers." Be-
cause the "status" of the injured party is considered together 
with the "situs" of the injury, the 1972 Amendments effectively 
narrowed potential eligibility for coverage .. s 
B. CASE LAW 
The Ninth Circuit in Weyerhaeuser Co. u. Gilmore·e was 
the first circuit court to interpret the "status" requirement after 
the LHWCA was amended.llo In Weyerhaeuser, a "pondman"lIl 
employed at a sawmillll2 was injured when he fell from a walk-
way into a log pond.1I3 Benefits under the LHWCA were denied 
by the courtll• because he was not engaged in maritime 
employment. 1I1I 
The Ninth Circuit held that before an injured employee can 
be compensated under the LHWCA, his actual work must have 
a realistically significant relationship to traditional maritime ac-
ters, is not covered even if injured on a pier adjoining naviga· 
ble waters. 
H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 10-11 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4698, 4708. 
45. 33 U.S.c. § 902(3) (1988). See supra note 3 for statutory language. 
46. 33 U.S.C. §902(3) (1988), states that longshoremen includes those persons en-
gaged in longshoring operations. Id. 
47. Id. A harborworker includes ship repairmen, shipbuilders, and shipbreakers. Id. 
Prior to this Amendment, an employee was "entitled to federal compensation if his inju-
ries occurred on navigable waters and his employer had an employee (not necessarily the 
injured employee) engaged in maritime employment." Weyerhaeuser CO. V. Gilmore, 528 
F.2d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1976) (to be eligible for LHWCA benefits, an employee's work 
must have a realistically significant relationship to traditional maritime activity involv-
ing navigation and commerce on navigable waters), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976). See 
infra notes 49-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of Weyerhaeuser. 
48. Northeast, 432 U.S. at 264-65. 
49. 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1976). 
50. Weyerhaeuser, 528 F.2d at 959. 
51. Id. at 959. A "pondman" sorts logs to be fed into the sawmill for processing into 
lumber or plywood. Id. 
52. Id. at 958. The sawmill was located on a salt-water bay of the Pacific Ocean. 
Parts of the bay adjacent to the plant were enclosed by docks and log booms for the 
purpose of holding logs being processed and are known as "ponds." Id. 
53. Id. at 958. 
54. Weyerhaeuser, 528 F.2d at 959. Claimant did receive state compensation bene-
fits for 21 days. Id. The court's opinion does not clarify the status of those state benefits 
after the 21 day period. 
55. Id. at 962. 
8
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tivity, and the disabling injury must have occurred on navigable 
waters or adjoining areas. 58 In Weyerhaeuser, the log pond was 
simply used as a way to transport logs from point to point in the 
log manufacturing process and had no close relationship to any 
maritime activity. 57 
The Second Circuit in Fusco v. Perini North River Associ-
ates,58 used the Weyerhaeuser test to deny LHWCA coverage to 
two laborers constructing a sewage disposal plant. 59 The laborers 
claimed they were engaged in maritime employment because 
they were harbor workers.80 The court stated that the claimants' 
activities were insignificant to navigation or commerce on navi-
gable waters because they were engaged exclusively in construct-
ing a sewage disposal plant.81 
The significant relationship test enunciated in Weyerhaeu-
ser was followed by several maritime circuits82 until the United 
56. Id. at 961 (quoting Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 
249 (1972) (some relationship required between the tort and traditional maritime activi-
ties involving navigation or commerce on navigable waters)). 
57. Id. at 961. The court found it "illogical to think of a pondman's work and duties 
at or on an upland sawmill's log pond as 'maritime employment' in the traditional 
sense." Id. 
58. 622 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1980) (claimant not covered under LHWCA where em-
ployment activities had nothing significant to do with navigation or commerce on naviga-
ble waters). 
59. Fusco, 622 F.2d at 1113. The laborers were injured over navigable waters while 
engaged in constructing a sewage disposal plant extending over the water. Id. at 1111. 
Id. 
60. Id. at 1111. 
61. Id. The Second Circuit noted: 
It is not significant that the [sewage] plant was being con-
structed so that sewage would not cause pollution of navigable 
waters; nor that the claimants performed part or all of their 
work while upon floating stages or upon barges. The only 
sense in which the claimants' activities were maritime was in 
the sense of their locus. 
62. See e.g., Schwabenland v. Sanger Boats, 683 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1982) (claimant's 
regular performance of maritime operations sufficient to confer status under LHWCA), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); Duncanson-Harrelson Co. v. Director, Office of Work-
ers' Compensation Programs, 644 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1981) (claimant satisfied status re-
quirement because he was injured over pre-amendment navigable waters); Miller v. Cen-
tral Dispatch, Inc., 673 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1981) (claimant's duties essential for ocean-
going vessels engaged in foreign trade thus essential to maritime industry); Odom Con-
str. Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 622 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1980) (where claimant 
was performing maritime work and where a significant part of employer's business was 
maritime, the policies of the LHWCA favored coverage), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 
(1981); Fusco v. Perini N. River Assoc., 622 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1979) (claimant not cov-
9
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States Supreme Court suggested the adoption of a more restric-
tive standard.8s 
In Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo,8' the 
United States Supreme Court considered whether an injured 
worker who loaded and unloaded containers, barges, and trucks 
at a pier811 satisfied the "status" requirement.88 The Court held 
that the "status" requirement is satisfied when a person spends 
at least some of his time in indisputably longshoring opera-
tions.87 In Northeast, the activities involved the loading of a 
ship's cargo; therefore, maritime employment was involved and 
the requirements for LHWCA benefits were satisfied.8s 
The issue of "status" was again addressed by the Supreme 
Court in P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford.8s In Pfeiffer, two warehouse-
men were injured and sought benefits under the LHWCA.70 One 
employee was injured while fastening military vehicles onto rail-
road fiatcars,71 and the second was injured while unloading a 
ered under the LHWCA where employment activities had nothing significant to do with 
navigation or commerce on navigable waters), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981). But 
see, Dorris v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 808 F.2d 1362 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (claimant truck driver failed status test of the LHWCA because he was in-
volved in overland transportation and was not engaged in activities integral to 
longshoring). 
63. See Herb's Welding v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414 (1985) (Under the 1972 Amendments 
to the LHWCA, Congress intended to limit benefits to those employees specifically in-
volved in the essential elements of loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel). 
64. 432 U.S. 249 (1977). 
65. Northeast, 432 U.S. at 255. The injury occurred when ship's cargo was being 
loaded into a truck. Id. 
66. Id. at 255. Caputo was hired by Northeast as a terminal laborer. Id. This posi-
tion involved carrying out any number of tasks involved with the transfer of cargo be-
tween land and maritime transportation, including stuffing and stripping containers, 
loading and discharging barges, and loading and unloading trucks. Id. at 273. 
67. [d. at 273. The Court stated: 
It seems clear, ... that when Congress said it wanted to cover 
"longshoremen," it had in mind persons whose employment is 
such that they spend at least some of their time in indisputa-
bly longshoring operations and who, without the 1972 Amend-
ments, would be covered for only part of their activity. 
Northeast, 432 U.S. at 273. 
68. [d. The Court concluded that, "[tJhe language of the 1972 Amendments is broad 
and suggests that we should take an expansive view of the extended coverage." [d. at 
268. 
69. 444 U.S. 69 (1979). 
70. Pfeiffer, 444 U.S. at 71. 
71. [d. The military vehicles had been delivered to the port by ship the day before 
the accident. [d. 
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bale of cotton from its transport container into a pier ware-
house.72 The Court held that at the time of the injuries, the 
workers were involved in maritime employment because they 
were engaged in intermediate steps of moving cargo between 
ship and land transportation.73 
The Weyerhaeuser significant relationship test may have 
recently been abandoned by the Supreme Court and replaced 
with the more restrictive standard articulated in Herb's Welding 
v. Gray.7. 
In Herb's Welding, the Court determined that the 1972 
Amendments were not meant to cover those employees injured 
in areas adjoining navigable waters unless they were engaged in 
loading, unloading, building, or repairing vessels.711 The claimant 
in Herb's Welding was injured while working on an off-shore 
fixed oil platform.76 He was denied LHWCA compensation after 
the Court determined that he was not engaged in maritime em-
ployment77 because he did not load, unload, build, or repair 
72. [d. Cotton arriving at the port from inland shippers entered storage in cotton 
compress-warehouses, then went by dray wagon to pier warehouses, and later were 
moved by longshoremen from the warehouses onto ships. [d. 
73. [d. at 83. The Court stated: 
We believe that [the statute's) explicit use of the terms "long-
shoreman" and "other person engaged in longshoring opera-
tions" to describe persons engaged in maritime employment 
demonstrates that workers doing tasks traditionally performed 
by longshoremen are within the purview of the 1972 Act .... 
[T)he crucial factor is the nature of the activity to which a 
worker may be assigned. 
Pfeiffer, 444 U.S. at 82. 
74. 470 U.S. 414 (1985). 
75. Herb's Welding, 470 U.S. at 424. The Court reasoned that when Congress 
amended the LHWCA in 1972 its purpose was to extend coverage to longshoremen, har-
bor workers, and others who were injured while engaged in "maritime employment" and 
while working in areas customarily used to load and unload ships or to repair or build 
ships. [d. at 420. Prior to the 1972 Amendments, the LHWCA only extended coverage to 
those accidents occurring on navigable waters. [d. Since Gray had nothing to do with the 
loading or unloading process he was not considered to be engaged in "maritime employ-
ment" as required under the LHWCA. [d. at 425. 
76. [d. at 416, 417. The platform was located in the Gulf of Mexico, off of the Loui-
siana coast. [d. at 416. 
77. [d. at 427. The Supreme Court held that claimant was not a maritime employee 
because there is nothing inherently maritime about building and maintaining platforms 
and pipelines. [d. at 425. The Court further noted that although "maritime employment" 
is not limited to those occupations specifically listed in 33 U.S.C. 902(3), it cannot be 
read to eliminate the requirement of a connection with the loading, unloading, or con-
11
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vessels.78 
The Herb's Welding standard was utilized by the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Miles v. Delta Well Surveying Corp.,79 a case involving a 
maintenance worker injured on a fixed offshore platform.80 The 
court noted that the worker, like the claimant in Herb's Weld-
ing, was not engaged in maritime employment as defined by the 
United States Supreme Court.81 The Fifth Circuit employed the 
Herb's Welding test again in King v. Universal Electric Con-
struction.82 In King, a lineman was running electrical lines 
across a river when he fell out of a boat and drowned.8s The 
court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the lineman did 
not satisfy the status test as set forth in Herb's Welding. 8" 
A Texas District Court also cited the Herb's Welding test in 
Bailey v. Global Marine, Inc. 86 In Bailey, a pressure testing 
worker was injured while on board ari offshore drilling vesse1.86 
The court noted that Herb's Welding narrowed the prior expan-
sive interpretation of status with its essential elements of load-
ing and unloading test.87 
struction of ships. Id. at 423·24. 
78. Id. at 425. 
79. 777 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1985) (under Louisiana law, employer is liable only for 
workmen's compensation payments and not damages in tort). 
80. Miles, 777 F.2d at 1070. The injury occurred on an offshore compressor station. 
A compressor station recompresses gas from outlying platforms for later use in produc· 
tion facilities. The worker was employed as a maintenance roustabout whose duties in· 
cluded cleaning the floors surrounding the large compressors on a daily basis and keep· 
ing the compressors in proper working order. Id. 
81. Id. at 1071. The court did not discuss the actual test set forth in Herb's Welding 
but stated that "[claimant) was not engaged in "maritime employment" as it is defined 
in Herb's Welding and is therefore not under the direct coverage of LHWCA." Id. 
82. 799 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1988) (spouse of lineman drowned in navigable river has 
remedy for wrongful death under general maritime law). 
83. King, 799 F.2d at 1073. The lineman fell from the boat while taking a "test 
ride." Id. 
84. Id. The court did not discuss the actual test a8 set forth in Herb's Welding but 
noted that the trial court's holding was correct. Id. 
85. 714 F. Supp. 235 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (employee is not a Jones Act seamen where he 
performs less than 10% of his work on vessels and is not permanently assigned to a 
vessel). See also Clark v. Solomon Navigation Ltd., 631 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D. Tex. 1986) 
(river pilot not included within the revised coverage of the LHWCA under the 1972 
Amendments). 
86. Bailey, 714 F. Supp. at 235. 
87. Id. at 240. The court stated that "[r)eliance on [an expansive interpretation) to 
give plaintiff 'status' under the LHWCA ... is misplaced in light of the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Herb's Welding v. Gray .... " Id. 
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Although Herb's Welding has been followed by several 
courts, two maritime circuits have not used the stricter standard 
for reasons that are not clear. The Eleventh Circuit, in Sanders 
v. Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding CO.,88 which was de-
cided three years after Herb's Welding, used the Weyerhaeuser 
"status" test to decide that a dry dock employee89 was engaged 
in maritime employment.9o The court decided that because the 
employee's duties significantly related to and directly furthered 
his employer's ship building and ship repairing activities, the 
employee was engaged in maritime employment.91 
The Fifth Circuit in Union Texas Petroleum v. PLT Engi-
neering, Inc. 92 also employed the Weyerhaeuser "status" test in 
resolving a contract dispute.93 
In 1989, the Supreme Court expanded the Herb's Welding 
test in Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co. v. Schwalb.94 In Ches-
apeake, the Court held that employees9~ injured while maintain-
ing or repairing equipment essential to the loading or unloading 
of a ship were covered by the LHWCA.96 The test has thus been 
88. 841 F.2d 1085 (11th Cir. 1988) (employee's responsibilities as labor relations as-
sistant satisfied status test under LHWCA). 
89. Sanders, 841 F.2d at 1086. Sanders' duties included boarding vessels under con-
struction or repair to inspect the progress of the work and to help maintain safe working 
conditions in the shipyard. [d. 
90. [d. at 1088. 
91. [d. Why the court did not follow Herb's Welding is unclear because the court 
did not discuss Herb's Welding in its decision. 
92. 895 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1990) (Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act requires ap-
plication of Louisiana law to non-maritime contract disputes arising over construction on 
the Outer Continental Shelf), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3247 (1990). 
93. Texas Petroleum, 895 F.2d at 1048. Although Weyerhaeuser was not specifically 
discussed, the court compared Texas Petroleum with an earlier Fifth Circuit case which 
used the "significant relationship to maritime activity" test. [d. The court did not clarify 
why it utilized the "significant relationship" test and not the test set forth in Herb's 
Welding. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. 
94. 110 S. Ct. 381 (1989) (railroad employees injured while maintaining or repairing 
equipment essential to loading maritime vessels are covered under the LHWCA). 
95. Chesapeake, 110 S. Ct. at 383. In Chesapeake, laborers engaged in housekeep-
ing, janitorial and repair services were injured while they were cleaning spilled coal from 
loading equipment to prevent fouling. [d. 
96. [d. at 385. The Court further explained its decision by stating: 
Someone who repairs or maintains a piece of loading equip-
ment is just as vital to and an integral part of the loading pro-
cess as the operator of the equipment. When machinery 
breaks down or becomes clogged or fouled because of the lack 
13
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enlarged to include not only those injured during the loading or 
unloading process, but those injured while maintaining or re-
pairing equipment essential to the loading and unloading 
process.97 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Coloma v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs,98 the Ninth Circuit held that a cook employed on a 
longwharf was not a maritime employee when injured because he 
was not engaged in the loading and unloading of a. ship; there-
fore, the status test as enunciated in section 902(3)99 of the 1972 
Amendments was not met. IOO 
The court found that the United States Supreme Court in 
Herb's Welding lOI intended to reject the Weyerhaeuser l02 "sig-
nificant relationship" test lOS and substitute an "essential ele-
ments of loading and unloading" test. IO• The Ninth Circuit thus 
disagreed with plaintiff's argument that the "loading and un-
loading" test was merely dicta. 1011 
The Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiff's argument that a long 
line of cases applying the "significant relationship" test had 
been broken. lOS The court explained that when it previously ad-
dressed the issue of "status," subsequent to Herb's Welding, it 
deferred to the Supreme Court's interpretation of "maritime 
employment."107 However, an apparent conflict between circuits 
of cleaning, the loading process stops until the difficulty is 
cured. 
Chesapeake, 110 S. Ct. at 385. 
97. [d. at 385. 
98. Coloma v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 897 F.2d 394 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
99. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1988). See supra note 3 for definition of maritime employee. 
100. Coloma, 897 F.2d at 400. 
101. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414 (1985). See .~upra notes 74·78 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Herb's Welding. 
102. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1976). See supra notes 49-
57 and accompanying text for a discussion of Weyerhaeuser. 
103. Coloma, 897 F.2d at 398. The court further noted that "[iJn Herb's Welding, 
the Supreme Court went beyond merely rejecting the Fifth Circuit's application of the 
'significant relationship' test; it rejected the test itself." [d. at 399. 
104. [d. at 398-99. 
105. [d. at 398. 
106. [d. at 399. 
107. Coloma, 897 F.2d at 399. The case the court was referring to was Dorris v. 
14
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was noted by the court.I08 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the 
"Seagull Inn" was unrelated to Chevron's loading and unloading 
functions, the Supreme Court's decision in Chesapeake lo9 could 
be distinguished. llo In Chesapeake, the Supreme Court found 
that benefits under the LHWCA could be granted because the 
injured worker had maintained equipment used to load and un-
load a ship.lll In Coloma, Chevron's longshoring activities had 
continued despite the closure of the Inn.ll2 Therefore, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that because the Inn's operation was unneces-
sary to the loading or unloading of a vessel, LHWCA benefits 
should not be granted to the Inn's COOk. 1l3 
V. CRITIQUE 
In Coloma,ll4 the Ninth Circuit stated that the Weyerhaeu-
serll" "significant relationship" test had been rejected and re-
placed with an "essential elements of loading and unloading" 
test articulated by the Supreme Court in Herb's Welding. 1l6 By 
its strict interpretation of Herb's Welding, the Ninth Circuit re-
jected a long line of cases that applied the "significant relation-
ship" test and adopted a position which one circuit has re-
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 808 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1987). In 
Dorris, the Ninth Circuit denied LHWCA benefits to a truck driver who drove trucks 
between a container dock and berths located in different harbors. Dorris, 808 F.2d at 
1364. The court held that these functions were not longshoring activities under the 
LHWCA and thus, not maritime employment. [d. at 1365. In Coloma, the court noted 
that in Dorris it did not specifically cite Herb's Welding but relied on Northeast Marine 
and Pfeiffer. Coloma, 897 F.2d at 399 n.8. 
108. Coloma, 897 F.2d at 399. The court briefly mentioned Sanders v. Alabama Dry 
Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 841 F.2d at 1088, whereby a test similar to the Weyerhaeuser 
test was applied. Coloma 897 F.2d at 399. 
109. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Schwalb, 110 S. Ct. 381 (1989). 
110. [d. at 400. 
111. [d. In Chesapeake, the Court concluded that "[t]he determinative considera-
tion is that the ship loading process could not continue unless the [equipment] was oper-
ating properly." [d. at 385-86. 
112. Coloma, 897 F.2d at 400. 
113. [d. 
114. Coloma v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 897 F.2d 394 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
115. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1976). See supra notes 49-
57 and accompanying text for a discussion of Weyerhaeuser. 
116. Coloma, 897 F.2d at 398-99. 
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jected,ll7 one district court has accepted,1l8 and one circuit has 
both accepted and rejected.1I9 
When Congress amended the LHWCA in 1972, its intent 
was to expand coverage to reduce the problems associated with a 
limitation based on arbitrary lines drawn at the water's edge.120 
Seemingly, the court in Coloma did not heed that intent and 
instead chose to draw its own "bright line," which severely re-
stricts coverage for longshoremen and harbor workers. This in-
terpretation is completely at odds with the language of the 1972 
Amendments which suggest that a broad and expansive view be 
taken of the LHWCA.121 
Using the Weyerhaeuser 122 test, courts have found coverage 
for a wide array of maritime workers.123 If Herb's Welding is a 
rejection of the Weyerhaeuser test, as the Ninth Circuit sug-
gests, potential coverage will be denied to many categories of 
maritime workers and limited for an exclusive class of shores ide 
workers. Limiting coverage to the "essential elements of loading 
and unloading of a vessel" simply does not conform to the ever-
changing environment of life on the waterfront.124 
The test advanced in Herb's Welding suggested that the Act 
117. See Sanders v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 841 F.2d 1085 (11th Cir. 
1988) See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sanders. 
118. See Bailey v. Global Marine, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 235 (S.D. Tex. 1989). See supra 
notes 85-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bailey. 
119. See King v. Universal Elec. Constr., 799 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1988); See supra 
notes 82-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of King. See also Miles v. Delta Well 
Surveying Corp., 777 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1985); See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of Miles. But see Union Texas Petroleum v. PL T Eng'g, 895 F.2d 
1043 (5th Cir. 1990); See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Texas Petroleum. 
120. See Northeast Marine Terminal v. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 256, 257 (1977). See 
supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of Northeast. See supra notes 
39-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1972 LHWCA Amendments. 
121. Northeast, 432 U.S. at 268. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Northeast. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the 1972 LHWCA Amendments. 
122. Weyerhaeuser, 528 F.2d 957. 
123. Hillsman, Through a Glass Darkly: A Curmudgeon's View of Longshore Cover-
age, 3 U.S.F. MAR. L. J._(1991). 
124. Hillsman, supra note 123. Hillsman notes that in 1962, longshoremen num-
bered in excess of 70,000 men but by 1985 that number had dwindled to only 29,759. 
This trend will doubtless continue, while potential beneficiaries under the LHWCA 
could well proliferate. Hillsman, supra note 123 at __ n.106. 
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should only cover those involved in loading, unloading, repair-
ing, or building a vessel. l211 Because they do not load or unload 
vessels, shipbreakers126 would not be covered if this test were 
literally applied. However shipbreakers are specifically listed as 
maritime employees in the statute and thus should be covered 
by the LHWCA.127 By adopting the narrow test articulated in 
Herb's Welding, the Ninth Circuit has either implicitly or inten-
tionally removed shipbreakers from coverage under the 
LHWCA. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Coloma 128 illustrates the 
problems inherent in the current version of the LHWCA. These 
problems could be solved by either a Congressional amendment 
to the current version of the LHWCA or by the United States 
Supreme Court addressing the problems and setting forth a 
clear standard for the admiralty courts to administer by. 
Jill Bennett* 
125. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 424 (1985). 
126. Shipbreakers break up vessels unfit for further use. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW IN· 
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2096 (1976). 
127. Hillsman, supra note 123. 
128. Coloma v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 897 F.2d 394 
(9th Cjr. 1990). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992. 
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